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Introduction
In this paper, we evaluate the strength of a pseudorandom number generator MUGI against linear cryptanalysis, adopting a truncated method. Linear cryptanalysis is one of the methods to distinguish a pseudorandom number generator from a truly random number generator [5] . It uses a linear correlation of an output sequence as the distinguisher between a pseudorandom number generator and a truly random number generator, and uses linear probability as a criterion of the resistance against linear cryptanalysis. If the maximum linear probability is small enough, the pseudorandom number generator is secure against linear cryptanalysis.
MUGI, proposed by Hitachi Ltd., is a pseudorandom number generator for a stream cipher [12] and one of the recommended ciphers of CRYPTREC, which is a project for the e-Government in Japan. It outputs a 64-bit string as a random number while updating two internal states, called state and buffer, at every round. The update function is composed of a linear function λ and a non-linear function ρ. The linear function λ is a linear feedback shift register and the non-linear function ρ has a structure based on Feistel scheme.
In the self-evaluation report [13] , designers have already evaluated the strength of MUGI against linear cryptanalysis, analyzing only the non-linear function ρ. They analyzed it by truncated linear cryptanalysis, which is a wellknown method to estimate an upper bound of the maximum characteristic linear probability, and showed that MUGI is secure against linear cryptanalysis. For the linear function λ, there is a paper in which Golic studied its characteristics [4] . In that paper, he claimed that a linear correlation among the output sequence of MUGI might be useful for its cryptanalysis because the linear function λ has a small period, which we have already reported in [10] , and a small linear complexity.
Coppersmith et al. showed a method to analyze a pseudorandom number generator that makes outputs while updating two internal states called state and buffer by a nonlinear function and a linear function [1] . In the method, two components of the pseudorandom number generator are analyzed independently and the results of those analyses are combined to estimate a correlation among its output sequence. They applied the method to SNOW and showed that SNOW is insecure against linear cryptanalysis.
In this paper, we analyze whole MUGI by truncated linear cryptanalysis. As Coppersmith et al. analyzed SNOW, we analyze the linear function λ and the non-linear function ρ independently and combine those results. MUGI has the structure such that the linear function λ has an input from the non-linear function ρ, which is different from the structure of the linear function in SNOW. In order to analyze the linear function λ, we regard it as a linear dynamic system and search for its relation among inputs and outputs by the state variables method. We also analyze the non-linear function ρ, using truncated linear cryptanalysis. From those results, we draw a trellis diagram by describing a linear path of λ and ρ function as the state variables for the diagram and estimate the upper bound of the maximum linear characteristic probability of MUGI by Viterbi algorithm. As the result, we conclude that the upper bound of the maximum linear characteristic probability of MUGI is less than 2 −138 and that MUGI is secure against linear cryptanalysis. [12] MUGI has two inputs, a 128-bit secret key and a 128-bit initial vector, and outputs a 64-bit string per round. Those (b) F function. Fig. 1 The structure of MUGI.
Pseudorandom Number Generator MUGI
inputs make two internal states called state a and buffer b. At round t, state a and buffer b are described as
2 ) (a
where t = 0 denotes the round in which MUGI outputs the first 64-bit string.
Initial internal states, a (0) and b (0) , are generated through the initialization process. In this paper, we assume that the initial internal states are chosen uniformly random and omit the description of the initialization. The output at round t is described as follows.
The state a and the buffer b are updated by a linear function λ and a non-linear function ρ. The update function of MUGI is shown in Fig. 1 and expressed as follows.
where < < < n denotes n-bit rotation to the left and F is a function illustrated in Fig. 1(b) . In Fig. 1(b) , S and M is the same s-box and matrix which are used in AES [2] .
Preliminaries
In this paper, we analyze a linear correlation among output sequence of MUGI by truncated linear cryptanalysis. This section gives some definitions for the cryptanalysis.
Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis is one of the methods to distinguish a pseudorandom number generator from a truly random number generator. The strength of a cipher against linear cryptanalysis is estimated by linear probability. If the maximum linear probability of a cipher is small enough, the cipher is secure against linear cryptanalysis. To estimate the exact maximum linear probability, however, is not practical for the computational cost. So the maximum linear characteristic probability is introduced. Those are defined as follows. (2) n → GF (2) n . For a given input and output mask, Γx, Γy ∈ GF(2) n , the linear probability of f is defined as
where • denotes the inner product over GF (2) .
For LP(Γx, Γy), we call the propagation of the masks, Γx → Γy, a linear path. Truncated linear cryptanalysis is one of the methods to estimate an upper bound of the maximum linear characteristic probability of a target cipher. In truncated linear cryptanalysis, we only use information on whether a mask of several bits, e.g., 8-bit, is zero or non-zero. To estimate an upper bound of the maximum linear characteristic probability by truncated linear cryptanalysis, we use active s-box and mask which are defined as follows.
Definition 3.4:
If the output mask of an s-box has a nonzero value, the s-box is called an active s-box, otherwise the s-box is called a non-active s-box. Also, if a mask has a nonzero value, the mask is called active, otherwise the mask is called non-active. Figure 2 illustrates the propagation rule of the linear path at a branch and an XOR that we must obey in truncated linear cryptanalysis. The linear path at a branch and an XOR is determined by the value of the masks. However, we do not refer to its value in truncated linear cryptanalysis because we only use information on whether a mask of several bits is zero or non-zero. So we have to consider three patterns of the propagation at a branch and one pattern of the propagation at an XOR, if a mask Γx at the branch and the XOR are active.
According to the above propagation rule, we search for the linear path that has the minimum number of active sboxes among all possible linear paths. Then the upper bound of the linear characteristic probability is estimated as follows. Let P be the maximum linear probability of the s-box and let as min be the lower bound of the active s-box number among all possible truncated linear paths. Then the upper bound of the maximum linear characteristic probability is estimated as P as min .
Outline of Our Cryptanalysis
The purpose of this paper is to estimate an upper bound of the maximum linear characteristic probability of MUGI. Since MUGI has a 128-bit secret key, the exhaustive key search requires 2 128 computation to compare an output sequence with all possible output sequences. If the maximum linear probability of MUGI is more than 2 −128 , linear cryptanalysis to distinguish it from a truly random number generator is more effective than the exhaustive key search. So we say that MUGI is secure against linear cryptanalysis if the maximum linear probability is less than 2 −128 . MUGI has two internal states, state and buffer, which are updated by the linear function λ and the non-linear function ρ, respectively. We analyze those functions independently and combine those results to estimate the upper bound of the maximum linear characteristic probability of MUGI. It should be noted that any internal states, state and buffer, except the output a (t) 2 can not be observed because we can watch only output sequence of MUGI. The outline of our cryptanalysis is as follows. (ii) For the linear function λ, we regard it as a linear dynamic system and find relations among outputs and inputs of λ function(Sect. 6). (iii) For the update function Υ, we construct a trellis diagram combining the results of the above analyses. We estimate the lower bound of the active s-box number by Viterbi algorithm (Sect. 7).
Analysis of the Non-linear Function ρ
Since designers have already analyzed the non-linear function ρ in the self-evaluation report [13] , the similar result of the linear characteristic of ρ function can be found in it. This section gives our result of the linear characteristic of ρ function because we need additional information to analyze MUGI in our cryptanalysis. Note that we refer to the results in [3] and [13] for analyzing F function. [3] , [13] In F function (see Fig. 1(b) ), S is the same s-box used in AES. Therefore, the maximum linear probability of the sbox is 2 −6 [3] . We consider the following two consecutive F functions to estimate the lower bound of the active s-box number of the non-linear function ρ [13] .
Linear Characteristic of F Function
Because of the characteristic of M that is the same matrix in AES, the maximum linear probability (Γ 0 → Γ 2 ) by 8-bit truncated linear cryptanalysis is estimated as follows. If Γ 0 Γ 2 , the lower bound of the active s-box number is estimated as 5 and therefore the maximum linear probability
, the lower bound of the active s-box number is estimated as 10 and therefore the maximum linear probability (Γ 0 → Γ 2 ) is less than (2 −6 ) 10 = 2 −60 .
Linear Characteristic of ρ Function
Before the analysis of ρ function, we use an equivalent representation of ρ function shown in Fig. 3 [12] . To distinguish two F functions in round t, we denote one of those by G function (see Fig. 3 ). Note that we omit the inputs of the constants, C 1 and C 2 , because those have no influence in our analysis. In the following, we call the function shown in Fig. 3 Fig. 4 . 
Analysis of the Linear Function λ

Linear Dynamic System Representation of λ Function
We regard the linear function λ as a linear dynamic system and analyze it to find relations between inputs and outputs by the state variables method. To use the state variables method, we describe the variables as follows.
• state variable :
15 )
• input variable : a (t) 1
• output variable :
10 ), where T (·) denotes the transposition of (·). By using the state variables, the state equation and the output equation are expressed as
where A, B and C are expressed as follows. 
where s is an operator that calculates 32-bit rotation to the left of a 64-bit variable (< < < 32 in Eq. (3)). Namely, for a variable x ∈ GF(2) 64 , s · x = x < < < 32. Note that s 2 is the identity mapping; s · s = 1.
Using Eq.(5), the zero input response, which shows the state variables at round t when all input variables a (t) 0 are zero, is written by
We computed the power of A and found that A 48 becomes the identity matrix I. Therefore, the period of λ is 48 rounds. This is the same result in [4] .
Using Eqs.(5), (6) , the output at round t is expressed as
Linear Characteristic of λ
As we showed in the last subsection, the output variables at round t is expressed as Eq. (11). To analyze relations between inputs and outputs of λ function, we make the following system of equations using Eq.(11) from round 0 to t − 1.
. . .
where M is a 2t × (3t + 16) matrix whose elements have a value, 0, 1 or s.
By an elementary transformation of the matrix M, the system of equations can be written by
where I and 0 denote the 16 × 16 identity matrix and the (2t − 16) × 16 zero matrix. M and M are a 16 × 3t matrix and a (2t − 16) × 3t matrix, which are determined by the matrix A, B and C. Note that those elements have a value, 0, 1 or s. In Eq. (13),
15 ) shows an initial value. Since we analyze relations between inputs and outputs of λ function, we pay attention to the following equation in Eq. (13) .
To find relations, we computed a basis of the matrix M . Note that we set t = 16 for the computation because the buffer b (t) consists of 16 units, (b
15 ). Then we found that all relations between inputs and outputs of λ function can be written by a linear sum of the following two equations.
Therefore, all relations from round 0 to t can be written by using coefficients C
∈ {0, 1, s} for two equations in a linear sum.
Strength of MUGI against Linear Cryptanalysis
We estimate the upper bound of the maximum linear probability of output sequence of MUGI. To do so, we adopt 64-bit truncated linear cryptanalysis and draw a trellis diagram by using the results of the analyses of ρ function and λ function. For drawing the trellis diagram, we express a linear path in round t as the state variables.
Drawing a Trellis Diagram
Linear Path in ρ Function
We showed all possible linear paths in ρ function of consecutive two rounds in Sect. 5. We express those paths as a variable that shows whether masks(or functions) are active or non-active. In this paper, we use information on whether the following are active or non-active to express a linear path in ρ function as the variable.
1 , a (t−1) 1
Linear Path in λ Function
We also showed in Eq.(17) that any relation between inputs and outputs of the linear function λ can be expressed as a
except s (t−1) = 0x000000 → s (t) = 0x000000 * estimate the minimum AS (t) s (t) and set it to AS Since we have to obey the propagation rule in Fig. 2 , if a
has an active mask, C (t−5) k 0 must have an active mask by the structure of MUGI (see Fig. 1 ). Also, if k
) must have an active mask. From the above consideration, we have to consider masks of at least last five rounds of C (t) k 0 and at least last eleven rounds of C
to express a linear path in round t. Hence, to express a linear path in round t as state variables, we use information on whether the following are active or non-active. Fig. 4) .
Using the fact that we can count the number of active s-boxes by observing a transition of state variables s (t) , we draw a trellis diagram and estimate the lower bound of the active s-box number by Viterbi algorithm. Fig. 5 shows the search of linear paths by Viterbi algorithm(Viterbi algorithm can be found in any textbook for error correcting codes, for example [9] ).
Viterbi algorithm, which is used for maximumlikelihood decoding of convolutional codes, is an application of the dynamic programming methodology. It searches a path that has the minimum number of costs(in this paper, the cost is the number of active s-boxes) using trellis diagram. In the trellis diagram, each state is expressed as an edge, which is denoted by circle in Fig. 5 . All possible transitions, s (t−1) → s (t) , are expressed as links in the diagram and each link attaches cost, which is the number of active s-boxes as (t) in this paper. In linear cryptanalysis, the internal states except a (t) 2 , which is the output at round t, can not be observed. Therefore a linear path that we concern about starts s (t s ) = 0x000000 and ends s (t e ) = 0x000000 via s (t) 0x000000 (t s < t < t e ). Also we concern about a linear path that has the minimum number of active s-boxes to consider the security of MUGI against linear cryptanalysis. Note that, without loss of generality, we set t s = 0 in the following. Let AS (t) s (t) be the minimum total number of active sboxes of a linear path from s (0) = 0x000000 to s (t) . Note that number in circles in Fig. 5 denotes those. In Viterbi algorithm, given the minimum number of active s-boxes by round t − 1, AS (t−1)
, we estimate the minimum number of active s-boxes by round t as follows.
AS (t)
We illustrate an example of this estimation in Fig. 5 . As we mentioned above, we can estimate the minimum number of active s-boxes of linear paths that we concern about.
Depth of the Trellis Diagram to be Explored
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2
−128 . We estimate the upper bound of the maximum linear characteristic probability, counting the lower bound of the active s-box number. Since the maximum linear probability of the s-box of MUGI is 2 −6 , the maximum linear characteristic probability of MUGI becomes less than 2 −128 when the number of active s-boxes is greater than 22.
In the trellis diagram, if all AS s (t+1) can not be less than 22 after the round and the upper bound of the maximum linear characteristic probability of MUGI is less than 2 −128 . Therefore, we can stop to draw the diagram at the round t when AS (t) s (t) are greater than 22 (see Fig. 5 ). 
Linear Probability of Output Sequence of MUGI
Paying attention to the above discussion, we estimated the lower bound of the active s-box number by a computer experiment. Table 1 shows the result. As Table 1 shows, we found that the lower bound of the active s-box number of all state variables s (t) exceeds 22 after 110 rounds and that the minimum number of active s-boxes among all possible linear paths that we concern about is 23. Since the maximum linear probability of the s-box is 2 −6 , the upper bound of the maximum linear characteristic probability of MUGI is less than (2 −6 ) 23 = 2 −138 . Therefore MUGI is secure against linear cryptanalysis. We show one of the linear paths that has the minimum number of active s-box in Fig. 6 as an example.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed MUGI as Coppersimith analyzed SNOW, i.e., two update functions were analyzed independently and those results were combined to estimate an upper bound of the maximum linear characteristic probability. For the non-linear function ρ, we estimated the lower bound of the active s-box number for all possible linear paths. For the linear function λ, we analyzed it by the state variables method, regarding it as a linear dynamic system. We expressed a linear path as the state variables of a trellis diagram using those results. From the trellis diagram, we estimated the lower bound of the active s-box number by Viterbi algorithm. As the result, we concluded that the lower bound of active s-box number is 23 and the upper bound of the maximum linear characteristic probability of MUGI is less than 2 −138 . Therefore, MUGI is secure against linear cryptanalysis.
